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The morning after the vote that 
wasn’t… 
By Alex de Ruyter and David Hearne, Centre for Brexit Studies 
There was never any real question over whether the parliamentary 
vote was going to be lost. The relevant question was always: how 
much would the Government lose by? If the prospect was of a narrow 
loss then it was likely that Theresa May would be able to use this to 
make some changes at the margins to reassure waverers and attempt 
another parliamentary vote within weeks. The fact that the vote was 
postponed indicates that any defeat was going to be utterly 
resounding. So what happens now? 
Theresa May is having meetings today in The Netherlands, Germany 
and Brussels with a view to seeking further compromises (particularly 
around the contentious backstop for Northern Ireland). This is likely to 
prove extremely challenging as the stated view of the EU is that the 
Withdrawal Agreement is final – any further changes or amendments 
are likely to be technical. One area that might be relatively easy to 
change is the political statement on the future partnership. This could 
be amended to suggest something more palatable to wavering 
Conservative MPs. However, it is not legally binding so this is unlikely 
to be sufficient to placate would-be parliamentary rebels. 
Nevertheless, additional clarifications of this nature might enable the 
PM to win over some waverers, alongside a strenuous campaign from 
“Leavers” in the cabinet. They are likely to stress the fact that there is 
a real possibility that – one way or another – Brexit might not occur. 
Given the scale of the expected parliamentary defeat, however, it is 
highly unlikely that this will be enough. 
The Prime Minister could seek to reopen discussions about the 
Withdrawal Agreement itself.  Even if the EU agreed, the timing is 
incredibly challenging – at present UK law states that parliament 
needs to vote on something by 21st January. If the Article 50 period is 
extended then parliament might vote to also move the 21st Jan 
deadline to a later date. This would need unanimous agreement of 
other EU members and an extension of more than 2 months is 
problematic because that is when elections to the European 
parliament are scheduled. 
We then face the fundamental question: what can realistically be 
changed? In order to avoid a hard border in Ireland, the north and 
south need to share a common customs territory and certain elements 
of the Single Market. One option is to alter the backstop such that the 
proposed customs union only encompassed Northern Ireland and not 
Great Britain. The problem with this is that Northern Ireland and Great 
Britain would then be in separate customs territories, which would 
enrage the Democratic Unionist Party and many Tory MPs still further. 
This was the initial EU proposal, incidentally. 
Another suggestion is that the Withdrawal Agreement might be 
amended such that the backstop made explicit reference to some kind 
of independently proven technological solutions. This might mollify 
Conservative Brexiters, although one would imagine that the EU 
would want to maintain some kind of say over what precisely would 
constitute sufficiently well proven solutions (as it would over any other 
external border). No such technological have yet been proven to the 
satisfaction of the EU (they have not been deployed anywhere in the 
world as yet). There is a small possibility of more substantive 
concessions on the part of the EU but this seems extremely unlikely. 
One other option that has been posited as a “plan B” is the adoption 
of a “Norway style” agreement as the future relationship. This would 
necessitate freedom of movement of labour, which is a red line for the 
UK government. It raises problems for the EU especially Article 102 of 
the EEA (European Economic Area) agreement, which allows 
members to withdraw with one year’s notice. As such, there would still 
be a need for a Withdrawal Agreement and a backstop, in case the 
UK later decided to withdraw from the EEA. 
At present, in order to become a member of the EEA, the UK would 
first need to (re)join EFTA (the European Free Trade Association). 
Naturally, other EFTA members would need to acquiesce to the UK 
joining EFTA and we know that there are concerns about this, 
particularly given the relatively tight timeframes involved. The EU 
would be concerned about fishing rights, which is not covered under 
the EEA. The UK (or at least Northern Ireland) would still need to be 
in a common customs territory with the EU with all the 
disadvantages/problems that entails (not to mention the problems of 
third-party FTAs, whether cumulation would be agreed with trade 
partners etc.). 
Finally, there is talk of another referendum. This raises a number of 
tricky issues, some of which are political and others are related to 
timing. There is now almost certainly insufficient time to properly 
organise, debate and hold a referendum prior to the 29th March 
deadline. The Government will need to act in some fashion by 
21st January at the latest. However, the EU might well be reticent 
about granting a longer extension to the Article 50 period due to the 
fact that there are elections to the European Parliament in late May 
2019. In other words, the UK might well end up with insufficient time 
to hold a referendum. More fundamentally, whatever the outcome of 
any referendum, it is likely that a substantial portion of the population 
will feel disenfranchised and deeply disaffected from the political 
decision that ends up being taken. Fundamentally, it is difficult to see 
an easy solution to the questions posed here (the improbable 
scenario of the UK unilaterally revoking Article 50 – a right confirmed 
by the Court of Justice of the EU notwithstanding). 
 
